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THE COURT’S DECISIVE HAND SHAPES THE EXECUTIVE’S
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICYMAKING POWER
KIMBERLEY L. FLETCHER ∗
ABSTRACT
A dynamic institutional relationship exists between the United
States executive branch and the United States Supreme Court.
This Article examines how the Court affects constitutional and
political development by taking a leading role in interpreting
presidential decisionmaking in the area of foreign affairs since
1936. Examining key cases and controversies in foreign policymaking, primarily in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this
Article highlights the patterns of intercurrences and the mutual
construction process that take place at the juncture of legal and
political time. In so doing, it is more than evident that the Court
not only sanctions the claims made by executives of unilateral decisionmaking, but also takes a leading role in (re)defining the
very scope and breadth of executive foreign policymaking.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has carved out a constitutional
space for executive unilateralism in the area of foreign affairs since rendering its decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 1 (“CurtissWright”) in 1936. The Court’s decision in Curtiss-Wright forever changed
the trajectory of the executive branch—prior to 1936, the Court decided
cases in favor of a strong Legislature formulating American foreign policy,
which undermined a president’s claim to executive unilateralism—and
placed the Court at the forefront of (re)defining the scope and path of foreign affairs powers. The utilization of this policy-making tool by the Executive cements the dynamic nature of the Court in how it has altered the constitutional and political development of both branches of government.

Copyright © 2013 by Kimberley L. Fletcher.
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Scholars that track doctrinal development in the area of foreign affairs
simply note a shift in power and explain how this change has resulted in executives claiming broad unilateral powers. To understand this shift, however, we must refocus our analysis to include a more detailed evaluation of
judicial decisionmaking and ask: how do we account for the Court’s decision to move away from the established constitutional blueprint set by the
Court’s early judicial rulings, to advocating for a strong presidential presence in foreign policymaking? What is it about this moment in time that
prompted the Supreme Court to move away from precedent and assert that
the Executive has a leading role in foreign affairs? What factors—internal
and external—existed at the time of the ruling to influence the Court to render a decision of this kind? To understand more fully this developmental
shift and its subsequent impact, we cannot focus solely on the internal doctrinal world—this is only useful to illustrate that a doctrinal shift took place
in 1936—or on the external political world. Rather, we must focus on the
intersection of legal and political time (two concepts that will be explained
below), which will parse out the factors that constrain judicial decisionmaking, and highlight the context in which a case reaches the Court. In so doing, we can determine whether the inclusion of foreign affairs, an area that
has been largely understudied in this way, adds to or changes the current
developmental narratives of the executive and judicial branches. This brief
overview of some of the most significant cases the Court has decided since
Curtiss-Wright showcases the influential role of the Court on the institutional dynamics of the Executive and shows that the Court has empowered,
and legally sanctioned, unilateral presidential action in foreign policymaking.
The Court does not operate independently from the political system
and is therefore situated at the juncture of law and politics. Since political
and legal time operate differently, it is important to understand how the
juncture of these two concepts impacts Supreme Court decisionmaking and
how, in turn, the Court impacts the political and constitutional development
of the executive branch when the Court decides a foreign affairs case. Doing so will help facilitate an understanding of the dynamic institutional relationship between the Court and the executive branch. On the one hand, political time, as defined by Stephen Skowronek, is the “various relationships
incumbents project between previously established commitments of ideolo-
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gy and interest,” and the President’s response to the perceived emergency. 2
Skowronek’s explanation of political time helps situate the presidency in
American political development. Legal time, on the other hand, is defined
by how the “Supreme Court interacts with the world outside the Court,” 3
including external factors or constraints occurring in political time. Legal
time is quite different from the political time of the presidency, and it is this
difference that has significant implications on the process of judicial decisionmaking. Courts are therefore “positioned at the juncture of law and
politics,” and the unique quality of the Court is “inherent in the nature of
judicial power.” 4 To further understand the positioning of the Court, I draw
from Ronald Kahn’s discussion of the mutual construction process to illustrate how judicial decisionmaking is influenced by external factors.5 The
internal norms of the Court and the external factors that exist in political
time are therefore explanatory conditions to understanding the constraints
placed on judicial decisionmaking and doctrinal change.
When the Court decides to hear a foreign affairs case, it makes constitutional choices that, at times, may challenge the primary commitments of
the majority coalition and the major political institution of the Executive.
Alternatively, the Court may choose key moments in which to collaborate
with an institution and make legal the construction and stabilization of an
asserted political order. Irrespective of the decision rendered, these constitutional choices demonstrate a continuous and constitutive dynamic relationship between both the Court and the executive branch. In the area of
foreign affairs, the Court has helped advance legal and political frames
since 1936, and these are narrative frames that the Court has appeared all
too willing to create.
The Court, as a decisionmaker, is intertwined with the political system.
Foreign affairs are no exception to this general paradigm. In 1936, Justice
Sutherland’s overarching decision in Curtiss-Wright illustrates a sharp departure for the Court. The following historical account of some notable epi-

2. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 30 (6th prtg. 2003).
3. Ronald Kahn, The Constitution May Be Undemocratic, but Not Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Difference Between Legal and Political Time, DIGITAL COMMONS@UM CAREY
LAW 3 (2006), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=schmooze_papers.
4. Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch, THE SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 16 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
5. See Kahn, supra note 3, at 4–7.

250

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:247

sodes between the Executive and the judicial branch demonstrates that this
change in path trajectory gives the Executive the legal positioning to advance broad claims to unilateral executive decisionmaking. As such, we
have borne witness to some outlandish claims by presidents, which have
found favor from the Court. In an attempt to understand this rapid growth
in power since 1936, I will highlight both the internal legal norms and external social and political constraints to demonstrate the fused process that
yields a superior position for the Executive over the legislative branch in
the area of foreign affairs.
II. EARLY JUDICIAL RULINGS
Prior to 1936, the Supreme Court decided foreign affairs cases in favor
of a strong Legislature and often limited the scope and parameters of the
dual partnership between Congress and the Executive. For example, when
examining Congress’s constitutional authority to declare war, the Court
found that it was the sole responsibility of the Legislature to wage a “partial” or “limited” war.6 And only when Congress authorizes war was the
President called in to serve as Commander in Chief. 7 The President, however, was not at liberty to choose the time, location or scope of military activities. 8 The Court reaffirmed these judicial decisions in 1804 in Little v.
Barreme. 9 In short, as Louis Fisher summarized, “[p]residential orders,
even those issued as Commander in Chief in time of war, are subject to restrictions imposed by Congress.” 10 Essentially, the Court asserted that the
President does not have inherent powers that give him the authority to ignore a law passed by Congress. 11 The one caveat the President had in this

6. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 43 (1800).
7. See Louis Fisher, Domestic Commander in Chief: Early Checks by Other Branches, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 961, 968 (2008) (discussing Congress’s power to declare war and the President’s power to direct war).
8. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 9–16 (1801) (discussing various acts by Congress that
designated military details for the war against France).
9. 6 U.S. 170 (1804). For a summary of the issue in Barreme, see Fisher, supra note 7, at
997 (“Part of the legislation passed by Congress in the 1798–1800 period, to authorize war against
France, authorized the President to seize vessels sailing to French ports. President Adams exceeded the statute by issuing a proclamation that directed American ships to capture vessels sailing to
or from French ports.” (internal citations omitted)).
10. See Fisher, supra note 7, at 997.
11. See Barreme, 6 U.S. at 177 (noting that President Adams’s orders clearly went beyond
the congressional statute).
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area was in the event that the United States was invaded, it would be lawful
for the Executive to oppose such an invasion. 12 This notion was based on
defending the nation and the idea that the President would seek out retroactive legislation. As the Circuit Court for the District of New York stated in
its 1806 decision in United States v. Smith 13: “Does [the President] possess
the power of making war? That power is exclusively vested in Congress . . . .” 14 Thus, if the United States was invaded, the President had only
the constitutional authority and obligation to resist with force, but “it is the
exclusive province of congress to change a state of peace into a state of
war.” 15
Later that century, the Court would address a president’s exercise of
military power without first procuring congressional approval.16 Following
the attacks on Fort Sumter in April 1861, and with Congress in recess, President Abraham Lincoln issued proclamations calling forth the state militia.17
He also suspended the writ of habeas corpus and placed a blockade on
southern ports (resulting in the capture of several prizes and their cargoes)
and rebellious states. 18 Lincoln, acutely aware that his actions were illegal,
requested statutory authorization from Congress. 19 While Congress ratified
Lincoln’s actions, 20 this situation marked the first time the Court would

12. See Act of May 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 264–65 (“An Act to Provide for Calling forth the Militia
to Execute the Laws of the Union, Suppress Insurrection, and Repel Invasions.”); see also Fisher,
supra note 7, at 976 (“As enacted, the militia bill provided that whenever the United States shall
be invaded, or be ‘in imminent danger of invasion’ . . . the president was authorized to call forth
such number of the militia as he may judge necessary to repel the invasion.” (internal citation
omitted)).
13. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16342).
14. Id. at 1230.
15. Id.
16. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (holding that the President did not
have the authority to order blockade and impound ships, even without formal declaration of war).
17. Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action
and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 56–57 (Christopher H.
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
18. Id. at 57–59.
19. See id. at 56–57 (noting that Lincoln called Congress in April 1861 to meet for a special
session in July).
20. See id. at 59 (“Congress approved in just over a week an array of wartime measures, including funding and authorizing an expanded army and navy.”).
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hear a case involving the power of the President to respond to sudden attacks. 21
In The Prize Cases, 22 the Court, while sharply divided (five to four),
reasoned that the President could not initiate war, as that authority was reserved for Congress, and Congress alone. 23 Lincoln found the secession of
several states and the possibility of open hostilities to be enough justification to impose a blockade on the southern ports. 24 While the President is
duty bound to rise to the challenge of invasion by a foreign nation to repel
sudden attacks, 25 Lincoln subverted this point, by declaring the Confederacy as belligerents. And, the commander-in-chief clause gave the President
the authority to proclaim a blockade as a method of waging war. 26 Justice
Robert C. Grier, who wrote the majority opinion in The Prize Cases, however, placed limits on the President’s power to act defensively: “He has no
power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State.” 27
These early judicial decisions demonstrate the entrenched path the
Court set for the partnership between the legislative and executive branches.
Assigning Congress the sole responsibility of initiating hostilities, whether
in the form of a general or limited war, left the President, in his capacity as
Commander in Chief, with only the power to repel sudden invasions against
the United States. 28
So what changed? How have presidents aggrandized so much power
to the point of telling the Supreme Court that they have no power of review? Harold H. Koh suggests that there are three reasons why the Executive always appears to have the leading hand when asserting a strong domi-

21. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 47 (2004) (discussing the Court’s affirmation of Lincoln’s emergency measures). The duty to repel sudden attacks signifies an emergency measure that grants the President the discretion to take actions necessary to resist a sudden
invasion that is waged either against the mainland or against American troops abroad. See id. at
47–48.
22. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
23. Id. at 668.
24. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 17, at 56–58.
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666 (“That the President, as the Executive Chief of the
Government and Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, was the proper person to make such
notification [of a blockade], has not been, and cannot be disputed.”).
27. Id. at 668.
28. These early decisions have never been overturned and remain the law of the land today.
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nant role in foreign affairs. 29 First, the Executive takes the initiative primarily by “construing laws designed to constrain his actions as authorizations”—as is evident by the use of the War Powers Resolution.30 Second,
Congress has, more often than not, complied with or acquiesced in what actions the President has chosen to take. 31 And lastly, judicial tolerance,
which is a point of departure from Koh’s argument in terms of the position
held in this Article.
III. CURTISS-WRIGHT—A DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT
The 1936 case of Curtiss-Wright marks the first step for the Court to
embark on a new path to (re)define the President’s role in foreign affairs
and assert itself as the institution to do so. This new role for both branches
over time has led to a comprehensive national acceptance “of the systematic
legal entrenchment” of an executive acting unilaterally in foreign policymaking. In many ways, Curtiss-Wright marked the end of an era. Following this decision, executives have gained significant momentum in this area,
and, with successive decisions by the Court, we have seen a distinct judicial
conjecture in favor of executive power in the area of foreign policymaking.
In the following discussion, I will demonstrate that Curtiss-Wright set a
new precedent for how the Court (re)defines executive authority and how
the Court has come to regard the Legislature as a secondary institution to
that of the executive branch. It is not until 2006 when the Court hears the
case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 32 that it admonishes (but not in formal legal
terms) the legislative branch to be a more active participant in the area of
foreign policymaking, specifically requiring Congress to grant statutory au-

29. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 158–80 (David Gray Adler &
Larry N. George eds., 1996).
30. Id. at 158. Primarily drafted to halt creeping wars like Vietnam, the Resolution has come
to symbolize, because of drafting flaws, statutory authorization undercutting the effectiveness in
restraining the President from initiating hostilities. Id. Consequently, when the President decides
to “violate[] congressionally imposed procedural constraints in pursuit of substantive policies that
they favor,” he does so under the guise of the Resolution. Id. at 172.
31. Koh argues that this is evident through “legislative myopia, inadequate drafting, ineffective legislative tools, or sheer lack of political will.” Id. at 158.
32. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).

254

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:247

thorization for the use of military commissions, which it did by passing the
Military Commissions Act 33 (“MCA”) in 2006.
The Court decided Curtiss-Wright at the height of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s “personalization and institutionalization of the presidency,”
which amongst many initiatives included an “extrovert phase in American
foreign policy.” 34 This marked the nation’s arrival as the world’s hegemonic power. 35 As such, geopolitical concerns would, in a number of cases, act
as external constraints on the Court. Essentially, Curtiss-Wright involved
the principles of governmental regulation of business and the supremacy of
the executive branch in the conduct of foreign affairs.36 The Court asserted
that while the Constitution does not explicitly vest in the President the authority to conduct foreign policy, it is given implicitly through the commander-in-chief clause, thereby empowering the Executive to conduct foreign affairs in a way that Congress can and should not. 37 In fact, the Court
stated the President had “plenary” powers in the area of foreign affairs that
was not dependent on congressional delegation.38 The Court, for the first
time, significantly changed the course and direction of constitutional and
political development for the executive branch in Curtiss-Wright.
The Court strategically positioned itself to redefine the scope and direction of the Executive’s prerogatives, which sanctions the “extrovert
phase” instituted by FDR. 39 It did this, first and foremost, by deciding to
hear the case and decide the case on its merits. As scholars have noted, the
Court could have invoked the political question doctrine and not hear the
case. 40 Second, it did so by redistributing the balance of power between the

33. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–50).
34. Koh, supra note 29, at 160 (noting that this time period began before the attacks on Pearl
Harbor and ended with the Vietnam War).
35. Id.
36. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 305–06 (1936).
37. Id. at 319–20.
38. Id. at 320.
39. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 96 (1990) (discussing the activist presidency of FDR, when the
“United States assumed unchallenged status as the world’s ‘hegemon’”).
40. See, e.g., David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 29, at 39 (“[The
Court’s] invocation of the political-question doctrine has been a major means by which the judiciary has strengthened the role of the president in the conduct of foreign policy.”).
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executive and legislative branches in the area of foreign affairs. But, why
did the Court make this move in 1936? What are the dynamics at play
when legal and political time intersect that make this case the “perfect
storm,” permitting the Court to (re)define presidential powers and shift authority away from Congress to the President in this area? Is political time
really influencing legal time? And, how does this doctrinal development
influence the political development of the executive branch?
Scholars have been highly critical of Justice George Sutherland’s theory on the separation of powers and, accordingly, have been quick to point
out that Justice Robert H. Jackson in the Steel Seizure case of 1952 noted
that much of Sutherland’s opinion is dictum. 41 Despite this criticism, it is a
worthwhile enterprise to (re)evaluate this case not only because of the
sweeping language but also because it is the lynchpin of many of the executive branch’s subsequent claims of the power to act without congressional
authorization in foreign affairs.
During the 1930s, the Court served as a check on New Deal legisla42
tion. At every turn in national policy where the cleavage between the old
and new regime was distinct, FDR was confronted with a judiciary predominantly held over from the old order. But the Court’s eventual support of
FDR’s New Deal legislation, coupled with an expanded view of executive
powers in the area of foreign affairs, helped facilitate the federal government’s growth in authority and responsibility.
In response to a potential war breaking out in the Chaco region of
South America, Congress authorized President Roosevelt to place an embargo on shipments carrying arms to countries at war in the region, specifically Paraguay and Bolivia since they were engaged, at that time, in a crossborder conflict. 43 Acting pursuant to the authorization of a joint resolution,
President Roosevelt issued Proclamation 2087 in May 1934, forbidding the
shipment of arms to the combatants in the Chaco region. 44 Curtiss-Wright

41. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 n.2
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
42. See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down New Deal
legislation on the grounds that they characterized unconstitutionally broad delegations of legislative power to the Executive); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (same).
43. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311–12 (1936) (detailing Joint Resolution 48 Stat. 811).
44. See id. at 312–13 (detailing Presidential Proclamation 2087); see also Proclamation No.
2087,
48
Stat.
1744
(1934),
available
at
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Export Corporation was charged with plotting to sell fifteen machine guns
to Bolivia. 45 This sale violated Presidential Proclamation 2087, and
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was indicted for violating the embargo. 46 The question before the Supreme Court was whether the congressional resolution was an unlawful delegation of legislative power.47
While the Court had already struck down significant pieces of New
Deal legislation, it was now faced with a case involving executive prerogatives in foreign policymaking. With the reproaches by the Court in the domestic arena, the Court was now positioned to render yet another decision
that might again be in opposition to the commitments of the majority coalition. So, how would the Court read discretionary executive power in this
area? Would the external framing of the situation and the administration’s
asserted authority to act influence the Court’s decision?
Justice Sutherland 48 found that the joint resolution was constitution49
al. Now, why would the leader of the conservative bloc, Justice Sutherland, write an expansive view of presidential authority to conduct foreign
policy? Part of the answer comes from his early and developing principles—when he served as Senator and Blumenthal lecturer at Columbia
University before joining the Court—of the division between domestic and

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14888#axzz1lpVgJyPc
(“Forbidding the
Shipment of Arm to the Combatants in Chaco”). On November 14, 1935, FDR issued a second
proclamation that revoked the previous proclamation, finding the prohibition on the sale of arms
to Bolivia and Paraguay no longer necessary since the war between the two countries had come to
an end. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 313; see also Proclamation No. 2147, 49 Stat. 3480
(1935), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=14978 (“Revoking the Arms Embargo at termination of Hostilities in the Chaco”) .
45. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311.
46. Id.
47. This prerogative is a legislative determination, the lawyers argued on behalf of the Executive, and Congress was leaving this right to the Executive’s “unfettered discretion.” Id. at 314–
15. This claim had judicial support, though Congressional Democrats and the White House were
severely critical of the Court’s decisions. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
48. The only opinion ascribed is that of Justice Sutherland; Chief Justice Hughes; Justices
Sutherland, Van Devanter, Brandeis, Butler, Roberts, and Cardozo made up the majority opinion.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311. Justice McReynolds dissented, yet there is no recorded dissent,
only a note at the end of Justice Sutherland’s opinion that Justice McReynolds believed “the court
below reached the right conclusion and its judgment ought to be affirmed.” Id. at 333. Justice
Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
49. Id. at 329.
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foreign affairs powers granted to the government by the Constitution. 50 As
demonstrated below, Justice Sutherland’s expansive view of presidential
authority to conduct foreign policy was, perhaps, an obvious evolution of
his visible agenda.
Justice Sutherland was a strict constructionist and tended to align with
the Court’s conservative side. 51 In fact, Justice Sutherland was regarded as
the leader of the conservative 52 bloc when a sharp division on the bench existed. By the time he reached the Court and a new constitutional order was
under way, Justice Sutherland’s early theories on the Executive’s external
powers had matured, and a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign
affairs now existed. He argued that there was a clear and definitive approach to deciding federal claims of foreign and domestic authority. 53
Broad delegations of power were unconstitutional—the Court’s reasoning
behind striking down New Deal legislation—even though Justice Sutherland advocated, early on in his career, for a broad reading of the Constitution: the Constitution must have the “capacity for indefinite extension” for
those who came after the Constitution was framed and adopted. 54 In his
early writings, Justice Sutherland said rather little on the matter of presidential constitutional powers. What he did say in Curtiss-Wright was that the
President had the sole responsibility to negotiate with foreign powers. 55
While Justice Sutherland valued the doctrine of stare decisis, he argued that precedent was not a fixed pathway, since it is the opinion only of
the person who came before and that person stipulated where the pathway
should be. 56 Path dependency of precedent in constitutional law, for Justice

50. See George Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the National Government,
191 N. AM. REV. 373, 374–75 (1910) (discussing differing levels of government power when the
government addresses internal versus external affairs).
51. PETER G. RENSTROM, THE TAFT COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY, 79–80
(2003). Justice Sutherland was part of the conservative “Four Horsemen,” which included Justices McReynolds, Devanter, and Butler—the four conservatives, holdovers from the Taft Court,
often convinced Justice Roberts to side with them, which gave them the majority. Id. These justices were instrumental in striking down Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. Id. at 80.
52. With Justice Sutherland’s decision in Curtiss-Wright, it is evident that conservatism does
not map in exactly the same way when we examine foreign affairs cases because Justice Sutherland was also an advocate for woman suffrage and female equality.
53. See Sutherland, supra note 50.
54. GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 50 (1919).
55. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
56. Senator George Sutherland, The Courts and the Constitution, Address Before the American Bar Association 386 (Aug. 28, 1912).

258

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:247

Sutherland, was not a controlling factor; and constitutional decisionmaking
on the Court would therefore be based in part on a Justice’s personal policy
preferences or strategic objectives. 57
After conveniently narrowing the question before the Court, Justice
Sutherland was free to begin the discussion with an account of his theory
from Constitutional Power and World Affairs. 58 He contended that there
are fundamental differences between the powers employed by the federal
government in the area of domestic affairs and external or foreign matters.59
The resolution delegating power to the Executive, he argued, might have
been unlawful if it had only applied to our Nation’s internal affairs. 60 Foreign affairs are a different issue, Justice Sutherland asserted, because different rules and standards apply. 61 Thus, Congress could delegate powers to
the Executive with a general set of standards or could give unrestricted discretion. 62 Going one step further, Justice Sutherland stated that the powers
granted to Congress could be exercised or delegated to the President and are
not limited to the express and implied powers constitutionally granted.63
Any limitations were only applicable to internal affairs. 64 What is more, the
President exercised “plenary and exclusive power,” which is independent of
any legislative authority, since he was the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.65
Justice Sutherland wove another concept into his conclusion, one
that was practically absent from his Constitutional Power and World Affairs 66 manuscript. He asserted that there is a significant limitation when
exercising power in the area of foreign affairs. This rhetorical caveat was
developed in his most famous passage of all. In what some have called “ill-

57. Id.; see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 903, 974 (2005) (“The point is not just that opinions reflect the differences among the
Justices but that the Justices know they may express their differences in their opinions if necessary.”).
58. SUTHERLAND, supra note 54.
59. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315–16.
60. Id. at 315.
61. Id. at 315–16.
62. Id. at 316.
63. Id. at 319–20.
64. Id. at 316.
65. Id. at 320. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia’s decisions regarding sovereignty in
international law mirrors, to a large degree, Justice Sutherland’s interpretation of sovereignty.
66. SUTHERLAND, supra note 54.
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considered dicta,” 67 Justice Sutherland contended that the role of foreign
affairs rested in the hands of the Executive. 68 His opinion invoked Congressman John Marshall’s reference to the President as the “sole organ” of
American foreign policy in a speech he delivered to the House of Representatives in 1800. 69 In that speech, Marshall asserted that the President
was the “sole organ” of communication.70 Justice Sutherland’s reference to
Marshall’s remark implies that the President makes foreign policy unilaterally.
It is remarkable that Justice Sutherland would distort Marshall’s reference to such a degree in order to ground his own assertions in a historical
frame. Justice Sutherland’s reference would be powerful evidence given
Marshall’s elevation a year later to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
When read in context, however, Marshall meant only that the President
communicates American foreign policy to other nations after it has been
adopted. 71 Marshall clearly meant that the President was the “sole organ”
in implementing—that is, merely announcing, not formulating—American
foreign policy. 72 Thus, the President would be the “sole organ” of communication; the nation would be speaking with a single voice. 73 Marshall’s
account of the President as the “sole organ” of foreign affairs, however, is
commonly distorted. It speaks volumes for Marshall’s view that, as Chief
Justice, he never invoked the “sole organ” doctrine in defense of unilateral
executive power in foreign affairs, though he had many opportunities to do
so. 74 In short, articulating the nation’s foreign policy to other countries did
not carry with it any form of inherent power. Justice Sutherland’s reliance

67. Adler, supra note 40, at 25.
68. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20.
69. Id. at 319 (“As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of
Representatives, ‘The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign affairs.’” (citing 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800))).
70. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800). Justice Sutherland infused Marshall’s phrase with
a substantive policy-making role, a claim not grounded in Marshall’s speech.
71. See Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine,
37 PRES. STUD. Q. 139, 142 (2007) (clarifying Marshall’s “sole organ” speech).
72. See id. (“Although it [is] the president’s constitutional duty to carry out the law, including treaties, ‘Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode.’” (quoting Marshall’s speech)).
Indeed, first and foremost, Marshall was referring to the President’s authority to “communicate,”
not “make” American foreign policy. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800).
73. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800).
74. See Fisher, supra note 71, at 142–43 (discussing Marshall’s approach to foreign affairs
cases as Chief Justice).
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upon Marshall’s speech as a foundation of the “sole organ” doctrine is thus
indefensible. Yet, it is a measure of Justice Sutherland’s mischief that confusion about Marshall’s speech has been pervasive ever since.
Justice Sutherland’s opinion is evidence of a change of heart from his
1919 defense of Congress’s authority and role in foreign affairs against federalism and the “narrow-construction attack to an assertion of the foreignaffairs authority of the president that stresses its independence of Congress.” 75 This change of heart 76 might be accredited, as discussed below, to
the external factors—the government’s argument, historical practice, and
the geopolitical impact of the growth of Fascism—that Justice Sutherland’s
opinion embraces.
On the initial reading of Justice Sutherland’s opinion, it is difficult to
ascertain what his assertions have to do with the question of delegation.
However, if one considers H. Jefferson Powell’s reading of Justice Sutherland’s opinion 77 and grants Justice Sutherland some latitude, one can consider that, since foreign affairs powers do not originate from the Constitution, they cannot be defined by it and are therefore plenary except when
they are limited by “applicable provisions of the Constitution.” 78 Continuing with this line of thought, Sutherland can then assert that the distribution
of these powers are not created; rather, the Constitution makes the President
the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations,” 79 and puts few limitations on his management of those affairs. The
President’s power in this area is therefore “delicate, plenary and exclusive.” 80 If the President is the primary decisionmaker in the realm of foreign policy—in the sense that Justice Sutherland is arguing that this is
structural in an extra-constitutional sense—and the President is responsible
for formulating that policy, then it naturally follows that a delegation rule
constructed to protect Congress’s role in defining policy is quite simply and
plausibly, according to Justice Sutherland’s assertion, inapplicable. 81

75. H. Jefferson Powell, The Story of Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL
POWER STORIES 195, 222 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
76. Sutherland’s early work warns about the growth of presidential powers, but this opinion
is clear evidence of him changing his mind.
77. Powell, supra note 75, at 195–96.
78. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 321–22.
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Moreover, and this is the point at which Justice Sutherland embraces elements of the government’s argument, when Congress legislates in foreign
affairs, it appropriately takes into account the President’s control, in principle and in practice, of intelligence, secrecy, and negotiation, which are argued to be essential factors to the success of foreign policy. 82
Justice Sutherland continued to discuss the issue further—relying fundamentally on a structural argument—by pointing out the history of legislation that had been granted to the President, which gave him broad discretionary power over international trade and other interrelated issues.83
Given the trajectory of Justice Sutherland’s theory and his assertions in
his written opinion for the Court, the decision rendered in Curtiss-Wright
was perhaps an observable evolution of his obvious schema, but not necessarily predetermined. This was a period of modernization for the presidency, but also a time that permanently ended American isolation from European and world affairs. In the 1930s, Congress and the country were
determined to remain an isolationist nation and stay out of the war raging in
Europe. But President Roosevelt, acutely aware of the impact of Hitler’s
progression, attempted to ally with France and Great Britain against Hitler’s
and Mussolini’s regimes.
The political timing of this case was not only a determining factor on
the severity of the President’s response to the situation at hand and the Chaco war more broadly, but also how the Court would weigh the external constraints when reaching its decision, as is evident by the geopolitical context
of the case. 84 This constraining external factor may account for Justice
Sutherland (re)framing and reformulating an opinion that embraces an expanded role for the Executive. This case highlights the juncture of legal and
political time, which created a constitutional moment that presented the

82. Id.
83. Id. at 322–24.
84. One way in which FDR wanted to counter Fascist advances was in the discretionary control over neutrality. An arms embargo against Italy and Ethiopia, for example, would achieve
Roosevelt’s agenda. See ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 1932–1945, at 107 (1995). It is interesting to note that the press discussed the case in the
geopolitical context. The Washington Post reported that the opinion in Curtiss-Wright vindicated
a president’s claim to a vast power in foreign affairs and, more specifically, President Roosevelt’s
quest for “‘authority for him to exercise wide discretion in limiting exports to combatants.’” See
Powell, supra note 75, at 225 (quoting Robert C. Albright, Highest Court Affirms Arms Embargo
Act, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1936, at 1). The Washington Post emphasized that the case “was generally believed to open the door for a more vigorous neutrality course, providing the approach is
discretionary with the President, rather than mandatory.” Id.
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Court with an opportunity to redefine the Executive’s powers through the
mutual construction process.
As H. Jefferson Powell aptly notes, the Curtiss-Wright opinion played
no significant role in the tug-of-war between the Executive and Congress
“over whether to grant the president discretionary arms-embargo authority
or impose on him a mandatory and impartial duty of neutrality in terminating American arms sales to warring states.” 85 Those opposing FDR had the
upper hand. In fact, Congress blatantly ignored the Court when it insisted
that Congress grant the Executive broad discretion.86
The case also played a rather narrow role as precedent in the first few
years of its decision. 87 What Curtiss-Wright did do was set the stage for
Justice Sutherland to speak again to the role of the President in foreign affairs. It also established a newly constructed constitutional blueprint for
executive supremacy in this area. Although Justice Sutherland’s opinion
insinuates that the President can make foreign policy unilaterally, the significance of this case is not immediately established. In fact, it did not have
any real impact for almost two decades. The result of the case is its evolution as precedent over time and how it became embedded in future presidential claims of broad discretionary power.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer 88 provides what some
would argue is the end point to the impact of Curtiss-Wright. 89 This is a
compelling assertion, since those who argue this point highlight the fact
that, by 1952, the delegation issue had retreated in significance and the specific holding in Curtiss-Wright was insignificant.90 To the contrary, United
States v. Belmont 91 and United States v. Pink 92—two cases decided in the

85. Powell, supra note 75, at 225.
86. See id. at 226 (“Sutherland’s opinion left Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry untouched, and it was the Supreme Court’s famous recession from its narrow view of federal power
beginning in March 1937, not Curtiss-Wright, that ultimately proved to have freed Congress and
the executive from the constraints that the 1935 delegation decisions appeared to have fashioned.”).
87. Id.
88. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
89. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 75, at 227 (“The Supreme Court’s celebrated decision invalidating President Truman’s seizure of the steel industry in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, decided in 1952, marks an appropriate end-point for an examination of Curtiss-Wright’s immediate impact.”).
90. Id.
91. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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immediate aftermath of Curtiss-Wright—along with Johnson v. Eisentrager, 93 are all cases that demonstrate the Court’s continued adherence to Justice Sutherland’s disinclination to be “in haste”94 to meddle with the Executive’s management of foreign affairs.95
IV. EXECUTIVE UNILATERAL CLAIMS OF EMERGENCY POWERS DURING
WORLD WAR II
The next time the Court heard a challenge to the Executive’s claim of
unilateral policymaking is with the Japanese Internment Cases. 96 These
cases came out of a time when many people in the United States, reeling
from the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, believed that Imperial Japan was waging a full-scale attack on the West Coast.97 Given Japan’s
swift military defeat of a substantial portion of Asia and the Pacific between
1936 and 1942, some Americans believed not only that Japanese military
forces were unstoppable, but they also questioned the loyalty of the ethnic
Japanese living in America. This doubt was fueled primarily by the racial
prejudices of General John L. DeWitt and the support of some prominent
senior military officers.98

92. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
93. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
94. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936).
95. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), was decided only four months after Curtiss-Wright, and
involved the validity of an executive agreement with the Soviet government. Id. at 326. Sutherland applied the same reasoning used in Curtiss-Wright to Belmont: favoring once again his developed distinction between the external and internal powers when he concluded that the national
government had the authority to enter into the agreement and invoked the language, while not
naming specifically Curtiss-Wright, that “in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that [national] government.” Id. at 330. In Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942), Justice Douglas expressly quotes from Curtiss-Wright the explanation of the Executive’s role as “sole organ,” and reaffirms that the President has the power to make binding international agreements without Senate ratification. Id. at 229. Justice Douglas went a step further and
held that Congress had “tacitly” approved of the executive agreement. Id. at 227. Pink was a case
decided when World War II was in full progress and the United States was fully invested. The
real impact of Pink was seen in the Court’s decisionmaking forty years later when it decided
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 100–103.
97. See Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV.
933, 937–38 (2004) (discussing various arrests and evacuations of Japanese Americans on the
West Coast post-Pearl Harbor).
98. Id. at 938.
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On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order
(“EO”) 9066, authorizing military commanders to designate “military areas” at their discretion, “from which any or all persons may be excluded.” 99
This authorization sent nearly 120,000 Japanese Nationals and Japanese
Americans to internment camps. In a cluster of cases—Hirabayashi v.
United States, 100 Yasui v. United States, 101 Korematsu v. United States, 102
and Ex parte Mitsuye Endo103—the Court considered whether the Executive
had exceeded his authority by claiming emergency powers, or whether it
was crucial to set in place an exclusion order due to military necessity.
Given public outcry and the political demands surrounding these cases,
the external social factors present another opportunity to examine the constraints on the Court when it balanced President Roosevelt’s unilateral
claim of emergency powers during World War II and the suspension of Japanese-Americans’ constitutional right to civil liberties. The Court ultimately sided with the President, asserting that he had statutory and constitutional
authority to act during an emergency. 104 It is the dialogue between the Justices and the discourse utilized in these cases that highlights the doctrinal
development and the entrenchment of the new path established by the Court
in Curtiss-Wright.
President Roosevelt did not claim inherent or exclusive constitutional
authority, but rather he asserted constitutional authority given to him by
way of being the President and statutory authority given to him by Congress. The Internment cases (re)confirm and validate Justice Sutherland’s
assertion that the President can make foreign policy unilaterally; they also
sanction the new path carved out by the Court in Curtiss-Wright—a path
that the Executive has also subscribed to and, in the present cases, has attempted to broaden.
In Hirabayashi, the Court unanimously held that a Japanese-American
citizen must obey the curfew regulations ordered by the Western Defense
Command. 105 While the nation was at war, the Court found, in both Hirabayashi and Yasui, that the application of curfews against members of a mi-

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938–1943).
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
320 U.S. 115 (1943).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
323 U.S. 283 (1944).
See infra text accompanying notes 105–110.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101–02 (1943).
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nority group were indeed constitutional. Justice Douglas wrote a concurrence in Hirabayashi and noted, “[W]e cannot sit in judgment on the military requirements of that hour.” 106
Executive prerogatives were further called into question in the landmark case of Korematsu in 1944. In a sharply divided six to three decision,
the Court upheld Korematsu’s conviction for violating EO 9066. 107 Justice
Hugo Black wrote the majority opinion, which rejected Korematsu’s discrimination argument. Siding instead with the government, the Court upheld the constitutionality of EO 9066 and, therefore, the government’s policy to relocate citizens in order to protect against espionage, thereby
outweighing the rights of Korematsu. 108 The Court reasoned the EO and
the actions it authorized were a constitutional exercise of the President’s
war powers. 109
While some actions taken by decisionmakers may seem unjustified,
given the political climate surrounding the Internment cases—and in this
instance, Korematsu—the Court reasoned that these decisionmakers are often faced with threats to the nation that call for extraordinary measures.
Courts, at times, may “implicitly rely on the good faith of executive officials . . . as the unstated basis for overlooking civil liberties problems with
the legal positions that the executive officials have staked out.”110
Endo was the only Internment case where the Court, unanimously,
found in favor of the plaintiff. The Court heard both Korematsu and Endo
at the same time, but delayed announcing the Endo decision until December
18, 1944. This was one day after FDR announced Public Proclamation No.
21, which ended the exclusion order on the Western Defense Command. 111
The political timing of this proclamation was a reflection of the President
ending incarceration and not a reflection of the Court reaching a decision on
the merits. In fact, the Court ruled on statutory grounds that EO 9066 and
9102 cannot be construed to give the War Relocation Authority (“WRA”)

106. Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring).
107. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
108. Id. at 219–20.
109. Id. at 217–18.
110. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and the National Political Order: Collaboration and
Confrontation, in THE SUPREME COURT & AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, at
124.
111. Public Proclamation No. 21, 10 Fed. Reg. 53 (Dec. 17, 1944).
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the power “to subject citizens who are concededly loyal” to detention in a
relocation center. 112
V. STEEL SEIZURE IS NOT THE END POINT FOR THE REACH OF JUSTICE
SUTHERLAND’S OPINION IN CURTISS-WRIGHT
A few years later, the Steel Seizure case of 1952 marked an extraordinary moment wherein the Supreme Court, during a time of war, used judicial review to check executive power. On April 8, 1952, President Harry S.
Truman announced that, to avoid a labor strike, the federal government was
to seize the steel mills of all major companies involved in a labor dispute
with the United Steelworkers of America. 113 This announcement was met
with uniform shock. While presidents in the past had seized plants, never
before had the government, during what was, by all intents and purposes, a
time of peace, apprehended a major portion of an industry as central to the
American economy as steel. Nor had a president laid claim to inherent executive powers under Article II of the Constitution to defend a seizure when
a statute—in this instance, the Taft-Hartley Act 114—provided an alternate
and legal method for thwarting the strike. 115
Truman’s actions created a political and constitutional crisis that solicited fundamental questions about the role of the President and the nature of
presidential power. Steel Seizure afforded the Court an opportunity to reexamine the balance of authority among the branches. More importantly, this
was an occasion for the Court to reassess and potentially (re)define the
scope of presidential power in light of almost twenty years of unparalleled
exploitation of executive authority. In this moment, Truman’s unprecedented action sparked the traditional constitutional and institutional debate:
Did the President act with legal authority? If he did not, what role, if any,
did Congress play in passing judgment? And finally, did that judgment fall
to the Court?
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Steel Seizure has become the
leading authority—dividing the President’s authority into three categories—
for how the Court defines the relationship between Congress and the executive branch and how the Court determines whether the actions taken by the

112. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944).
113. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
114. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 135 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141–187 (2006)).
115. Id. at 586.
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President are legitimate. 116 It is an opinion that is often cited by the Court
and invoked by presidents. While Steel Seizure demonstrates the limit of
the executive branch’s reach and scope of power when acting as Commander in Chief, it also illustrates how external forces—the Korean Conflict—
did not constrain the Court.
Additionally, Steel Seizure illustrates why the Court did not find that
the President’s military power extended to labor disputes. The case took
place against a backdrop of two decades in which presidents had steadily
expanded their power and the judiciary had all but sanctioned its continued
growth. As such, this development of power led Truman to assert that he
had the authority to seize the mills. Truman believed that taking over the
mills was necessary to safeguard the continued need of supplies to American troops in Korea and to support the healthy economy the nation was enjoying. 117 Truman envisioned a quick end to the hostilities and therefore
attempted to downplay the seriousness of the course of action taken. During a press conference, Truman definitively stated, “We are not at war.” 118
After being questioned by a reporter, Truman acceded that the United Nations operation could be characterized as a “police action.”119 The Korean
Conflict soon became a war in every practical sense, however. As such, the
Court’s decision in Steel Seizure is what some would call an unexpected
decision. Given the sizeable reasoning for Truman’s action, why would the
New Deal-Fair Deal Court that had previously been so receptive to the exercise of presidential authority use this case to restrain the use of inherent
executive power?
From a historical standpoint, the decision in Steel Seizure is a sharp
rebuke to President Truman’s seizure and an attempt by the judicial branch
to immobilize the accumulation of power by the executive branch. Justice
Jackson criticized and rejected Justice Sutherland’s opinion in CurtissWright when he wrote his concurring opinion in Steel Seizure, observing
that the language used by Justice Sutherland merely insinuates that “the
President might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but
not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress.” 120 Justice Jackson

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 582–83 (majority opinion).
The President’s News Conference, 179 PUB. PAPERS 502 (June 29, 1950).
Id.
Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 636 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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asserted that much of Justice Sutherland’s opinion was dicta and bore no
relevance to the issues presented in the Steel Seizure case. 121
An examination of the Steel Seizure opinions demonstrates that the
Court’s holding was not a simple case of rebuke and not as sweeping as the
broad language may initially suggest. Justice Black, FDR’s first nominee to
the Court and an ardent supporter, 122 quickly earned a reputation for “decisiveness, forthright thinking, strong attitudes, and impatience with legalism . . . .” 123 In most instances, Justice Black favored government intrusion
to regulate business and labor’s right to assist itself with the backing of auspicious legislation. 124 In general, Justice Black interpreted the words of the
Bill of Rights literally to thwart government intrusion with personal liberties; during wartime, however, civil liberty claims had to give way before
the needs of the government. This was the case when Justice Black authored the majority opinion in Korematsu; when the war powers of the government conflicted with individual rights, the safety of the nation necessitated the sacrifice of the latter.125 With this reasoning, it was not
unthinkable to expect Justice Black to sustain Truman’s seizure of the steel
mills, given the hostilities in Korea, international concerns, and the administration’s assertions that steel was indispensable to the United States and its
allies. In this instance, however, the Court sided with Congress against the
President’s assertion of unilateral power and found no congressional statute
authorizing the President’s actions. 126
There is a tacit understanding that decisions by the Court are profoundly impacted by the political climate surrounding a case at hand. Seldom, however, do Justices acknowledge this realization. Then-Justice William H. Rehnquist’s book, 127 written in 1987, recalls an exception that
occurred when he served as a law clerk for Justice Jackson at the time the

121. Id.
122. For a detailed account of Justice Black’s career before joining the Court, see VIRGINIA
VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK: THE ALABAMA YEARS, 3–108 (1972). For Justice
Black’s appointment to the Court, see William E. Leuchtenburg, A Klansman Joins the Court: The
Appointment of Hugo L. Black, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1973).
123. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND
VALUES 1937–1947, at 258 (1948); see also Leuchtenburg, supra note 122, at 22–23 (discussing
Justice Black’s early days on the Court).
124. PRITCHETT, supra note 123, at 208, 258.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 107–109.
126. See supra text accompanying note 109.
127. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS (1987).
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Steel Seizure case was argued and decided. During his time as a law clerk,
he believed the Truman Administration was on solid ground with respect to
legal precedent in Steel Seizure. 128 So why did Truman lose by a vote of six
to three? Evidently, Truman’s delineation of executive power was too
sweeping for the nation, and strong public opinion 129 opposing his policies
constrained the Court’s decision. As then-Justice Rehnquist pointed out: “I
think that this is one of those celebrated constitutional cases where what
might be called the tide of public opinion suddenly began to run against the
government, for a number of reasons, and that this tide of public opinion
had a considerable influence on the Court.”130
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion has had the greatest impact on
contemporary constitutional analysis and “[n]o other statement by a Justice
has so concisely and insightfully defined the limits and scope of presidential
power.” 131 Given this impact, Justice Jackson’s concurrence is discussed at
length. He split from the purely textual approach advocated by Justice
Black, deducing that:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. . . . Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress. 132

128. Id. at 94–95.
129. This check on presidential power is contingent on the general public expressing its trepidations and articulating that sentiment to the courts as well as to Congress. This prerequisite places a heavy burden on the individual citizen: it expects them to be cognizant of the use of executive
power, to evaluate its use, to ask the Legislature or judicial branch to rein in that power, and to
give its full support to the constraints imposed by either of the two branches.
130. REHNQUIST, supra note 127, at 95; see also MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL
SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (Duke Univ. Press 1994) (1941). Marcus
makes a similar observation. District Judge David A. Pine’s decision, which held against Truman,
“apparently influenced public opinion, for the Gallup Poll taken after the announcement of the
ruling showed less support for the seizure than had been evidenced in previous polls. This popular
reaction, which theoretically should not have had any effect on the outcome of the [Steel Seizure]
case as it traveled through the higher courts, as a practical matter became an important element in
the legal decision-making process.” Id. at 130.
131. Louis Fisher, Foreward to MARCUS, supra note 130, at xii.
132. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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Given this position, Justice Jackson sets out a three-tier framework,
which not only addresses the relationship between Congress and the executive branch, but also stipulates how the Court will determine whether the
actions taken by the President are legitimate. 133 As many before have noted, Justice Jackson divided the President’s authority into three distinct categories. Tier one asserted that presidential power is at its zenith “[w]hen the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress”
because “it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” 134 In such a situation, the President is dependent on his
own powers as well as those delegated to him by the legislative branch.
It is tier two, known as the “Twilight Zone,” that is of particular interest. Justice Jackson maintained:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable,
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. 135
In this instance, if the President’s power were in doubt, the legality of
his act was “likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.” 136 It is this
point—and to some degree, the two aforementioned tiers—that demonstrate
the Court’s acceptance and willingness to take into consideration external
forces and to be constrained by them when rendering a decision.
Tier three provided that presidential power is at its lowest ebb when
it is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,” as the

133. Id. at 635–38.
134. Id. at 635.
135. Id. at 637. This could either be an indication of an expanded view of legislative deferrals,
or it is simply politically unpopular for Congress to be seen as a war hawk. For an expanded discussion of legislative deferrals, see GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY
AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003); see also Mark A. Graber,
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV.
35 (1993).
136. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637.
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President may only rely upon his own constitutional authority. 137 In this
circumstance, the President depends on his own constitutional powers, excluding whatever constitutional authority Congress could have over the issue. In this instance, the Court could uphold an executive’s action only by
finding that Congress could not act in the situation.138
The Court has embraced Justice Jackson’s three-tier analysis to resolve
continued issues of presidential power in the area of military and foreign
affairs. 139 Justice Jackson counseled, “[l]oose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal discussion of presidential powers. ‘Inherent’ powers, ‘implied’ powers, ‘incidental’ powers, ‘plenary’
powers, ‘war’ powers and ‘emergency’ powers are used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable meanings.” 140 Advocates of granting the President immense power can shift their claim to one of implied
constitutional power.
For President Truman, the Court’s decision came out of left field. He
clearly expected an auspicious ruling and therefore took the decision as a
personal censure.141 Events occurring in the two decades prior to the decision suggested that the Court would not restrain presidential power. The
Court’s majority, however, was not swayed by the President’s assertion that
the crisis confronting the nation was grave enough to justify a claim of inherent executive power to seize private property. Despite the Court’s rul-

137. Id. at 637.
138. Id. at 637–38. The extent to which the third category is applied is exemplified by President Reagan’s role in the Iran-Contra affair. To justify their actions, the Reagan Administration
used the theory of extra-constitutional powers. At the time, aides to the President utilized the
teachings of Curtiss-Wright and extended the notion of executive power beyond the counsel given
by Justice Sutherland. During the Iran-Contra hearings, Oliver North stated that the President had
the power to authorize and conduct covert actions with non-appropriated funds—funds acquired
from private parties from foreign governments. See Iran-Contra Investigation: J. Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and
the H. Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong. (1987) (testimony of Oliver L. North). The issues at hand in Curtiss-Wright did not deal with this kind of
dispute, and the dicta used to support the necessity of secrecy and confidentiality in foreign affairs
in that case did not offer any support for North’s assertions. But this incident does reflect the executive branch’s continued use of Curtiss-Wright.
139. See infra Part VI.
140. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 646–47.
141. See MARCUS, supra note 130, at 214–15.
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ing, presidents have—with large success 142—advanced Justice Jackson’s
three-tier analysis as the legal authority to act unilaterally.
VI. THE IMPACT OF STEEL SEIZURE
To identify the extent to which a president claims broad unilateral authority in foreign affairs following Justice Jackson’s three-tier analysis,
Dames & Moore v. Regan 143 and Regan v. Wald 144 provide another opportunity to examine the Court’s role in re-defining executive power in this area. In Dames & Moore, the Court found the President’s claim to an executive agreement, which declared a national emergency and froze Iranian
assets, was grounded in statutory authorization because Congress had tacitly endorsed the President’s agreement. 145 According to the Court, the “general tenor of Congress’ legislation in this area” allocated broad discretionary
authority to the President. 146 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
asserted that “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘longcontinued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a
presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent.’” 147

142. The “zone of twilight” helps explain the successful use of power by many presidents subsequent to this case and its ruling. When President Jimmy Carter declared his intention to unilaterally terminate a defense treaty with Taiwan, his legal authority to terminate a treaty without the
advice and consent of the Senate was called into question. When this case reached the Supreme
Court, Justice Powell echoed Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Steel Seizure, stating, “If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so.” Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 998 (1979). Similar decisions were handed down in the cases involving the Reagan
Administration and its use of the war power in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada, and in the Persian Gulf. For example, in a war powers case involving President Reagan and Nicaragua, Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who later became a member of the Supreme Court, noted “Congress has
formidable weapons at its disposal—the power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond
those available in the Third Branch. . . . Congress expressly allowed the President to spend federal funds to support paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.” Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d
202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsberg, J., concurring); see also Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to exercise jurisdiction in a case challenging U.S. actions in Grenada);
Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (declining to exercise jurisdiction in a case
challenging U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C.
1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding a lawsuit challenging U.S. actions in El Salvador not justiciable).
143. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
144. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
145. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669–74.
146. Id. at 678.
147. Id. at 686 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)).
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As a final point, the Court argued from a public policy standpoint that
the President needed the freedom to act; in this case, the need to use frozen
assets as “bargaining chips” in delicate negotiations.148 The Court declared
that if such a power was not granted to the Executive, “the Federal Government as a whole [would] lack[] the power exercised by the President . . . .” 149 Relying explicitly on Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Steel
Seizure, the Dames Court did conclude, however, that the legislative
branch’s failure to pass a statute articulating disapproval was tantamount to
an invitation to the President to act unilaterally. 150 For the Dames Court,
congressional silence was indistinguishable to the sanctioning of presidential initiatives.
The Dames decision demonstrates a marked—albeit engineered—shift
in authority from Congress to the President. And, because the opinion rests
on statutes that do not directly speak to the issue, the decision illustrates the
Court’s recognition of broad presidential power in foreign relations. While
the Steel Seizure Court did not speak explicitly to the issue of inherent powers, the Dames Court confirmed the relevance of Justice Jackson’s concurrence to finding that the President may possess inherent powers when responding to international emergencies. The Court, therefore, emphasized
the constraining external factors when considering cases in this area.
In Regan v. Wald, the Court found exceptions to justify and sanction
broad discretionary authority to the President when President Ronald
Reagan restricted travel to Cuba because of national security needs—the
ever-pervasive Cold War. 151 The Court reasoned that the legislative branch
authorized the President’s actions,152 and sanctioned them with, as Steel
Seizure phrased it, the “widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”153 Even
though Congress asserted a dominant role by enacting provisions to “tie the
hands” of the President and fence in the far-reaching scope of presidential
authority, the Regan Court found in favor of the Executive. 154 This decision demonstrated that even though Congress attempted to rein in the Presi-

148. Id. at 673–74.
149. Id. at 674.
150. Id. at 678–79.
151. 468 U.S. 222, 230–244 (1984).
152. Id. at 232.
153. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
154. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 244 (1984).
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dent, it was up to the Court to determine what power and authority the President had. Given the Court’s determination in this matter, it granted more
power to the Executive, essentially stripping the authority of the legislative
branch to statutorily determine what checks and limits would be placed on
executive powers. Furthermore, despite Congress’s post-Vietnam legislative assertiveness to rein in the powers of the Executive in foreign policy,
the Court determined that this kind of opposition had essentially run its
course. The Court’s position on presidential control of foreign policy
would therefore win out.
VII. UNPRECEDENTED UNILATERAL CLAIMS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Two decades later, the Supreme Court would have another chance to
(re)evaluate Congress’s role in the area of foreign affairs. Following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration mounted
an offensive war against, what it would deem, a nontraditional enemy; it
was, therefore, a new kind of war—a “War on Terror.” This contention
suggests the necessity of a more robust review by the courts of the administration’s detention policies when balancing concerns of national security
and the protection of individual liberty. The set of cases challenging the
Bush Administration’s detention policies are labeled, quite apropos, the Detainee Cases. The Detainee Cases appraise the controversial treatment of
the executive power used during the War on Terror by the Bush Administration—policies vis-à-vis the capture, detention, and legal processing of
suspected terrorists since 2004.
This cluster of cases includes Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 155 Rasul v. Bush, 156
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 157 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 158 and Boumediene v. Bush. 159
In the end, the Court sided with the Bush Administration on fundamental
constitutional grounds, but constrained it statutorily.
Even though this juncture, or constitutional moment, provided the
Court with an opportunity to change the course taken by the executive
branch and require a more dominant role by Congress, the Court ultimately
took into account external constraints that sanctioned the President’s asser-

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

542 U.S. 426 (2004).
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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tions and assisted in developing a new baseline, one that established the necessity for taking into account the executive’s framing and assertion of an
alternative understanding on how to handle a unique war. The War on Terror was a nontraditional war, and, as such, necessitated actions contrary to
traditional standards.
Since 1936 when Curtiss-Wright was decided, granting implicit executive power, the clear trend of case law was to support the President’s use of
emergency and war powers. 160 The discretionary latitude afforded to the
President is particularly evident given the response of the federal courts to
President Bush’s assault on the War on Terror. Even though the President
sought and received congressional support for many of the actions taken to
combat this war, the White House did not suggest, at any point, that it needed congressional approval for the policies it implemented. 161 In fact, President Bush, on numerous occasions, emphasized his unilateral authority to
conduct a unique war how he saw fit.
In June 2004, the Supreme Court ruled in three related cases: Rasul v.
Bush, 162 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 163 and Rumsfeld v Padilla. 164 These three cases address the President’s anti-terror initiatives and executive claims of unilateral power. The Administration also claimed the President’s authority
was unreviewable by the judiciary and could not be checked by a coordinate branch of government. In two of the three cases, however, it appears the Court placed some statutory limits upon executive authority.
The Bush Administration claimed that the President is granted broad
war-making powers when acting in the constitutional capacity of Commander in Chief to conduct a successful campaign. 165 Moreover, the Au-

160. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, supra note 39, at 138 (“The Burger Court had several
opportunities to read Curtiss-Wright strictly and thereby to rein in this executive practice. On
each occasion, however, it ruled in the president’s favor, approving rather than rejecting his selfserving construction of the statute in question.”).
161. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 506 (2002) (noting that in the past, “when Congress has actually authorized troop deployments in hostilities, Presidents have taken the position
that such legislation, although welcome, was not constitutionally necessary.”).
162. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
163. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
164. 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
165. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 161.
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thorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) Act, 166 a joint resolution
passed by Congress immediately following the September 11 attacks,
granted the President considerable latitude in the conduct of hostilities.
This Act also gave the President the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force against those who aided or abetted in the terrorist attacks.167
Rasul v. Bush was the first habeas corpus case to reach the Court. The
question before the Court was whether it had jurisdiction to hear legal appeals filed on behalf of the foreign citizens who were being held at Guantanamo Bay’s naval base.168 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the six to
three opinion, holding that Guantanamo Bay was territory under American
jurisdiction, thus entitling the prisoners to habeas corpus hearings. 169 More
importantly, the petitioners’ rights to habeas corpus were not dependent on
their citizenship status. 170
In its 2002 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 171 (“Hamdi II”), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit quoted Curtiss-Wright, asserting that when assessing national security concerns, the President wields
“plenary and exclusive power.” 172 Citing Steel Seizure, the Fourth Circuit
also said this power is superior when the President acts “with statutory authority from Congress.” 173 While the court did not indicate which statutes
might have authorized the President’s actions, it went on to affirm the President’s constitutional power—as supported by the Prize Cases and Dames
& Moore—to conduct military operations, determine who would be considered an enemy combatant, and decide the rules governing the treatment of
such individuals. 174 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 175 (“Hamdi III”) in 2003, the
same court concluded the President had near unfettered discretion when
faced with an emergency, and it was inappropriate for the Judiciary to

166. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
167. Id.
168. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).
169. Id. at 480–81.
170. Id. at 484–85.
171. 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002).
172. Id. at 281 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936)).
173. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–
37 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
174. Id. at 281–82.
175. 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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weigh down presidential decisions with what the court called the “‘panoply
of encumbrances associated with civil litigation.’”176
When Hamdi III reached the Supreme Court, the Court was unable to
agree on a unanimous line of reasoning, resulting in the six to three vote
that the AUMF granted the President authority to detain a United States citizen as an enemy combatant because the President’s action was pursuant to
an act of Congress. 177 Specifically, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote
that because “the AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals,” it gives the President the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force against “nations, organizations, or persons.” 178
Justice O’Connor, however, reminded the Administration that the
Rehnquist Court would not become a rubber stamp for an administration
that was attempting to “condense power into a single branch of government.” 179
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Court made clear that presidential actions
were, indeed, subject to judicial scrutiny, placing some constraints on the
President’s unfettered power. 180 Ultimately, however, the Court declined
on procedural grounds to rule in this case.181 Justice Stevens’s dissenting
opinion is interesting, however, for a couple of reasons. He asserted that
the arguments stated by the Court could not justify avoiding its duty to respond to the question the case raised: Did the President have the authority
to detain Padilla by claiming a broad inherent or emergency power? 182 Justice Stevens argued, “[t]his is an exceptional case that we clearly have jurisdiction to decide.” 183 He further maintained that the case before the
Court gave the Justices an opportunity to review the actions taken by the
Administration and the constitutional claims made by the President when he

176. Id. at 465 (quoting Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283–84).
177. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
178. Id. at 517–18 (internal quotations omitted).
179. Id. at 536.
180. 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) (explaining that the Court granted certiorari to review, in part,
the legality of Padilla’s military detainment pursuant to the President’s determination that he is an
“enemy combatant”).
181. Id. at 451.
182. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (emphasis added).
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invoked inherent power—terms echoing Curtiss-Wright—to deny Padilla
his civil liberties in the name of national security. 184
Ultimately, the amalgamation of Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla provide
the most definitive statement yet of what powers are afforded to the President when detaining so-called enemy combatants. The Court, weighing the
legal norms and external factors (the mutual construction process), was
constrained by extenuating circumstances and found, in large part, in favor
of the Executive.
The composition of the Court had not changed in almost ten years, not
since Justice Breyer replaced Justice Blackmun. It had been its longest period of stability. President Bush, however, would have the opportunity to
appoint not one, but two nominees to the Court in 2005. This would yield a
new Court dynamic, one that the Administration hoped would continue to
vote in their favor. Since Justice O’Connor—known as having immense
power as a swing voter—was no longer on the bench, Justice Kennedy’s
vote became the one to watch. 185 Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence
Thomas, and the newly confirmed Justice Samuel Alito were likely to align
themselves with the Bush Administration, leaving Justices Souter, Breyer,
Stevens, and Ginsburg to side with plaintiffs.
The Court under Chief Justice Roberts would now be left to answer the
important questions left unanswered by the Rehnquist Court when it ruled
in Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla. For example, no five Justices could settle on
the exact kind of legal process Hamdi or other enemy combatants should be
given. Of course, this lack of consensus was not necessarily met with disapproval by the Bush Administration.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush were the two final cases
for the Court to review. The Court was split five to three in Hamdan. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded that special military tribu-

184. See id. at 461 (“[T]his case is singular not only because it calls into question decisions
made by the Secretary himself [under the President’s order], but also because those decisions have
created a unique and unprecedented threat to the freedom of every American citizen.”); see also
id. at 465 (“Even more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.”).
185. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636
(2006), in which he concluded the petitioners had the privilege of habeas corpus, but noted the
Court would not address whether the President has the authority to detain these petitioners nor
would it hold that the writ must be issued. Justice Kennedy also delivered the majority opinion in
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
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nals 186 must either be established by statute or, if created by presidential order, must follow rules and procedures consistent with the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and the Geneva Conventions. 187 Moreover, the
mere assertion of inherent powers did not grant the President the authority
to establish military commissions. 188 The upshot of Jusitce Stevens’s opinion amounted to a more systematic reproach to the Administration than the
Court had issued two years earlier. Procedures could not be written for the
military commissions unilaterally—Congress had to approve them—nor
could the procedures ignore Geneva Conventions; in fact, they had to comply with the treaty. 189 The courts also had an important role to play and had
to be involved from the start and not just when the detainees were convicted
and sentenced. 190 Even though the Court ultimately invalidated these particular tribunals, it did accept the principle that the President has the authority to order that those he believes to be unlawful combatants be tried by
military tribunals so long as, the Court asserted, the tribunals were lawfully
constituted. 191
Acting pursuant to the Court’s counsel, the President asked Congress
for the authorization to create special tribunals operating under basically the
same rules and procedures as those declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Congress acted forthwith and acceded to President George
W. Bush’s request by passing the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”), 192
which the President promptly signed into law in October 2006.
Even though in Boumediene the commissions were ultimately challenged and subsequently found by the Court to be an unconstitutional suspension of a prisoner’s right to habeas corpus, the decision in Hamdan
demonstrates the Court acting as a mediator between the two branches. Insisting that Congress play a more prominent role identifies the Court’s
prowess to force another institution to act in order for it to sanction, statutorily, the actions taken by the executive branch. Consequently, since the

186. A Combatant Status Review Tribunal was established for Hamdan’s case by the U.S. Department of Defense on July 7, 2004. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 570 (majority opinion).
187. Id. at 567.
188. Id. at 593.
189. Id. at 620–25. Justice Stevens, however, did not have a majority for all parts of the Geneva Conventions analysis. Id. at 564.
190. Id. at 633–35.
191. Id. at 594–95.
192. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006)
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a–950w and other sections of Titles 10, 18, 28, and 42).
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President sought, and Congress approved, statutory authorization, the
Hamdan decision does not appear to posture a demonstrable challenge to
presidential power during a time of war.
Boumediene involved a more direct confrontation to the Bush Administration’s authority because it challenged the constitutionality of the MCA.
In a five to four split, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that
the habeas statute extended to non-citizens at Guantanamo as a guarantee
under the Constitution, and that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who had been labeled “enemy combatants” by the Bush Administration. 193
The Court’s assertions were a sharp reproach to the Administration’s
contention that it could offer an alternative constitutional understanding. 194
In fact, the Court stated, it is not the “regime” that has the authority to say
“what the law is,” but the Court’s authority. 195 What this illustrates is an
institution not willing to back down in the face of the Executive’s attempt to
commandeer the Court’s role in defining the President’s powers and scope
in foreign policymaking. When challenged on the supremacy over constitutional interpretation, the Court will confront the primary commitments of
the majority coalition and (re)establish its institutional legitimacy. While
the courts have upheld certain due process rights of individuals classified by
the Administration as enemy combatants, what these decisions have not adequately addressed is the core war-making powers of the President. As
such, the Court’s (re)definition of those powers remain largely intact.
The initiation of the War on Terror by the Bush Administration saw
national security powers unavoidably encroaching on domestic issues with
the U.S.A. Patriot Act (2001) 196 and the newly formed Homeland Security
Department—a multi-faceted agency that responds to tornadoes, floods, and
terrorists. The War on Terror has been a long drawn out effort that has become almost a permanent fixture of our political reality, as the Cold War

193. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008).
194. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 15
(2007) (noting that, at times, various political actors, in this instance the Executive, seek to supplant other potential constitutional interpreters (the Court in this case) and assert their own authority to define the powers or “content of contested constitutional principles”).
195. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
196. United and Strengthening America—Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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was for many years. When the line between foreign and domestic policy
becomes blurred, the President’s expanding pool of foreign policy powers
will take on greater domestic prominence, which is sure to yield protests
and political inconveniences that dare to confront a president’s monopoly
over foreign policymaking—as was possibly the situation in the Steel Seizure case.
Recently, we have witnessed President Barack Obama utilizing the
unbridled unilateral power that so many presidents197 before him have
claimed—a power the Court has legally sanctioned. The President is making full and unprecedented use of drone warfare, which is quickly becoming
the cornerstone of his national policy. A secret memorandum released to
the Senate by the Justice Department in February 2013 goes beyond what
was said publicly about the legal justifications for targeting Americans who
are suspected as operational leaders of al Qaeda. 198 These broad interpretations by the Obama Administration may usher in new questions for the
Court and we will see, perhaps, if the Court will find in favor of the great
elasticity with which this Administration is exercising the commander-inchief clause, and whether the President can broadly interpret his power to
defend the nation to include the use of drones. As should be evident, even
when the Court has appeared to hand a president a loss, Justices proceed
with caution when evaluating the potential ramifications of their decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At the onset of military exigencies, Congress and the public at large
give presidents enormous freedom of action in the realm of foreign and security policy. But how the federal courts define the appropriate balance between security and liberty, which has the potential effect of constraining the
Executive, is relevant to understanding how U.S. foreign policy and the relationship between Congress, the President, and the courts has evolved.
Adjudicating competing concerns over the security of the nation and the
liberty of the individual presents a more significant challenge for the Court

197. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Covert Operations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 87–97 (LOUIS HENKIN, MICHAEL J. GLENNON, & WILLIAM D. ROGERS eds.,
1990) (discussing the ways in which Congress allowed the executive branch to circumvent its policies regarding covert actions).
198. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL
OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF
AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE , available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/
sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
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than simply resolving domestic policy disputes. As such, to understand judicial decisionmaking requires a better grasp of the factors affecting each
Justice’s decision, including their alliance to bedfellows on the Court and
political leanings. In short, the Supreme Court tends to support a president’s Hamiltonian view of his role in foreign policy. This is evident with
Justice Sutherland’s 1936 opinion in Curtiss-Wright—that the President is
the “sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.” 199
While the Steel Seizure case all but relegated Curtiss-Wright to a footnote—describing Justice Sutherland’s opinion as dicta in Justice Jackson’s
concurrence—this has not curbed presidents from asserting a dominant role
in foreign affairs. In fact, Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-Wright is
oft-cited by the Court to support claims of “broad delegations of legislative
power to the President” and also “the existence of independent, implied,
and inherent powers for the President.” 200 Moreover, many politicians and
the public at large generally have accepted this assertion. This trend has
exalted presidential power far beyond the constitutional blueprint advocated
by the Court prior to 1936 and enters into the realm of unilateral executive
dominance. While the decisions rendered by the Court have not always invoked Curtiss-Wright, the essence of Justice Sutherland’s opinion has infused other techniques invoked by the Court, such as the “political-question
doctrine, grounds of nonjusticiability, and the silence and inaction of Congress.” 201 This overview of the past seventy-five plus years demonstrates a
trend that perpetuates the usurpation of powers by the President and the
overarching claim that the President is granted superior authority in foreign
affairs. Given this trend, extra-constitutional arguments as presented by
those supporting a powerful executive have a sturdy foundation.
Curtiss-Wright has never been overruled and, when viewed narrowly
to only the decision rendered, no one has ever really questioned the Court’s
ruling. It has been an “authority” on which those rallying for support of
plenary presidential powers independent of congressional delegation rely.
For those intent on championing unilateral presidential action in the area of
foreign affairs, or in challenging congressional attempts to limit the Executive’s discretion in this realm, Justice Sutherland’s profuse language has
shown to be alluring:

199. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
200. FISHER, supra note 21, at 73.
201. Adler, supra note 40, at 27.
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In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to
speak or listen . . . Congress itself is powerless to invade. . . .
[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress . . . . 202
Executive branch lawyers, therefore, understandably have not refrained. As Harold H. Koh noted, “[a]mong government attorneys, Justice
Sutherland’s lavish description of the president’s powers is so often quoted
that it has come to be known as the “‘Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right’ cite”—a
statement of deference to the president so sweeping as to be worthy of frequent citation in any government foreign-affairs brief.” 203
While it is evident that no post-Steel Seizure decision by the Supreme
Court visibly rested on the Curtiss-Wright decision as controlling precedent, what this analysis has identified is a discernible change in trajectory
by the Court in the area of foreign affairs. Furthermore, the Court asserts
its authority to define presidential power at the juncture of political and legal time. It is apparent from the analysis that Justice Sutherland’s opinion—drawing largely from his early writings—also embraced some of the
arguments presented by the government, and the political timing of the case
placed the Court in the prominent position of changing the path trajectory
of the executive branch, altering not only the subsequent path taken by presidents, but also how an executive can frame arguments in the future when
claiming a broad prerogative. The Court’s dynamic institutional role influenced the development of constitutional law and the political development
of the executive branch.
Curtiss-Wright is also a story of how a Court decision, at the juncture
of legal and political time, can escape almost all of its contemporary context, and how both lawyers and the Executive can utilize and reinvent the
decision so that what it stands for has virtually nothing to do with the original case. As H. Jefferson Powell noted, “Marbury v. Madison rested the
power of the Court to determine constitutional meaning on the duty of the

202. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20.
203. KOH, supra note 39, at 94 (quoting Brief for Respondents, Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981), at 30, 40, 44, 52, 53; Brief for Appellees, Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989), at 18–19, 22, 24–25, 44).
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judicial branch to decide cases[, but] Curtiss-Wright suggests that the
Court’s constitutional role may be, at times anyway, very different.”204
The Court’s judicial tilt toward the executive branch caught the attention of such scholars as Edward Corwin, who argues that courts often defer
to the executive branch because presidential exercises of power frequently
generate changes in the world that the U.S. judiciary feels powerless to invalidate. 205 This analysis, however, demonstrates the sophistication of the
Court and its dynamic role in (re)defining executive powers in the area of
foreign affairs.
The Court serves as an architect in (re)defining executive unilateral
powers in foreign policymaking. It is the continuous and constitutive relationship between the Court and the Executive that has elevated the President’s authority far beyond the Court’s early judicial rulings. As Keith
Whittington noted, “[t]he creation or recognition of a new power by one
president necessarily empowers his successors . . . .” 206 I would assert that
as the Court (re)defines the Executive’s power in the area of foreign affairs,
it not only empowers that president, but also grants to succeeding presidents
the empowerment to act forthwith. As such, we have witnessed the Court’s
direct hand in shaping the growth of the President’s unilateral powers and
institutionalized this prerogative in the area of foreign affairs.

204. Powell, supra note 75, at 196.
205. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, at 16 (4th ed.
1957).
206. WHITTINGTON, supra note 194, at 17.

